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Fractured Fairy Tale: The War on Terror
and the Emperor's New Clothes
Ian S. Lustick*
I. THE INVISIBLE IRRATIONALITY OF THE WAR ON
TERROR
The War in Iraq has become politically radioactive. It is a
burden, not a boon, to any politician associated with it. Not so
the War on Terror. It continues to attract the allegiance of
every politician in the country, whether as a justification for
keeping U.S. troops in Iraq (to win in the "central front" in the
War on Terror), or as a justification for withdrawing them (to
win the really crucial battles in the War on Terror at home and
in Afghanistan). Both official rhetoric and practice, including
wars abroad, massive surveillance activities, and colossal
expenditures, have bolstered the reigning belief that America is
locked in a death struggle with terrorism. Since 2001 the entire
country, every nook and cranny, has been officially deemed to be
exposed to at least an "elevated" risk of terrorist attack-
"Threat Condition Yellow"-with episodes and particular
locations sometimes labeled as Orange, meaning "severe" risk of
terrorist attack. By mid-2006 the United States had spent at
least $650 billion dollars on the War on Terror, including
expenditures linked to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the
three years between October 2002 and October 2005, high-
ranking Department of Defense officials gave 562 speeches with
some version of the word "terror" in their titles. That means
* Professor, Bess W. Heyman Chair, University of Pennsylvania. Ph.D., University
of California-Berkley, 1976. Author of Trapped in the War on Terror (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
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they gave 36 percent more speeches about terrorism than about
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's signature theme
(transformation of the military), 22 times more speeches about
terrorism than about nuclear weapons, 43 times more than
about proliferation, and 51 times more than about ballistic
missile defense. 2
What is true of the government and of politicians is also
true of an American public which seems convinced of the
potency of the threat and the necessity of the war. Five years
after the 9/11 attacks, and despite the absence of attacks since
then or of any evidence of serious preparations for an attack
inside the country, 76 percent of Americans responded
affirmatively to a New York Times/CBS News Poll that asked
whether they believed "the terrorist threat from Islamic
fundamentalism is constantly growing and presents a real,
immediate danger to the United States . . . ."3 Sixty percent
said they thought the United States should do more to try to
prevent further terrorist attacks. 4 Seventy-four percent said
they were "somewhat" or "a great deal" concerned "about the
possibility there will be more major terrorist attacks in the
United States" (up from 71 percent three years earlier).5 Thirty-
five percent said they were somewhat or a great deal worried
that such an attack would harm them personally (a level of
worry that has remained more or less constant since 2001).6 As
instructive as these answers to polls are, even more
enlightening are the questions. Of the scores, probably
hundreds, of polls done regarding the prosecution of the War on
Terror-how it should be conducted, how well the government is
doing, how important to it is the Iraq War, how much more
should be done in it-it is difficult, indeed, impossible to find a
survey by a major American polling organization that has even
asked the question "Do you think there should be a War on
Terror?"
Of course popular perceptions are not molded or sustained
only by the speeches and actions of government officials and
2. U.S. Department of Defense, Speeches, http://defenselink.mil/speeches/
index.aspx (last visited Feb. 01, 2007) (research on file with author).
3. PollingReport.com, War on Terrorism, CBS News/New York Times Poll
(Sept. 15-19, 2006), http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm.
4. PollingReport.com, War on Terrorism, ABC News Poll (Sept. 5-7, 2006),
http://www.pollingreport.comterror.htm.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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politicians, nor only by the narratives and assumptions of the
news media-though the news media too has been a major
cheerleader for the War on Terror. The entertainment
industry-in novels, television shows, films, and made for T.V.
movies-has hyped the fears that fuel the War on Terror and
keep it alive. Thus has the War on Terror embedded itself into
popular culture. Both Hollywood and the television networks
have plunged aggressively into the preparation and distribution
of films and television dramas depicting threats of catastrophic
terrorism. These have included the film The Sum of All Fears,
featuring the destruction of Baltimore by a nuclear bomb
smuggled into the country by terrorists; Face of Terror, about a
Palestinian terrorist bomber in Spain; Antibody, about an
international terrorist with access to a nuclear detonator;
American Heroes: Air Marshal, about a jetliner hijacked by
terrorists with ambitious plans; When Eagles Strike, about
terrorists who kidnap an American senator; and Blast!, about
terrorists who take over an oil rig to detonate an electro-
magnetic bomb over the United States. A quick survey of a
bookstore in Philadelphia International Airport in the summer
of 2005 revealed that of 35 paperback novels for sale to travelers
waiting to board their planes, seven shared fundamentally the
same plot-imminent disaster at the hands of maniacal
terrorists that might still be thwarted by courageous counter-
terrorist action. These 20 percent included Tom Clancy's
Splinter Cell, Michael Crichton's State of Fear, Dan Brown's
Deception Point, James Patterson's London Bridges, and Robert
Ludlum's the Lazarus Vendetta.
Made-for-television movies on these themes were also
plentiful. These included Winds of Terror (2002), about a
biological weapon attack on the United States; Operation
Wolverine: Seconds to Spare (2003), about terrorists hijacking a
train to release enough poison gas to destroy a large American
city; The President's Man 2: A Line In the Sand (2002); about a
secret agent's effort to foil terrorists constructing a nuclear
weapon; Smallpox 2002: Silent Weapon (2002), about a
bioterrorist smallpox attack; The Pilot's Wife (2002), about the
terrorist bombing of a 747 airliner; Counterstrike (2003), about
terrorists with a nuclear weapon who hijack the Queen
Elizabeth II luxury liner; Critical Assembly (2003) in which a
nuclear bomb produced by students is stolen by terrorists; and
Tiger Cruise (2004), about a navy ship's reaction to the 9/11
20071
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attacks. Of all the made-for-television movies and theatrical
releases dealing with terrorist themes in recent years, however,
there is probably no movie that has had a wider viewership than
Dirty War (2004), an extremely realistic docudrama depicting
Middle Eastern terrorists who detonate a radioactive "dirty
bomb" in London. Produced by the BBC and originally aired in
Britain, the film was then delivered to HBO in the United
States, which broadcast it repeatedly in early 2005.
During the regular viewing seasons of the past few years,
television viewers have been treated to half a dozen new shows
about terrorism and/or specialized military, intelligence, and
law enforcement agencies fighting terrorists. These programs
have included: The Agency (CBS); NCIS (CBS); Threat Matrix
(ABC); Alias (ABC); The Unit (CBS); and most popular of all, 24
(Fox). The entire 2005 season of 24 was devoted to a story line
involving a sleeper cell of Middle Eastern terrorists in the
United States that unleashes a nuclear-tipped missile against a
major American city.7 In December 2005 the Showtime cable
channel presented a miniseries about Islamic terrorists in the
United States entitled Sleeper Cell. As Michael Ealy, the star of
the show, put it: 'This show is about the reality of the Beast
that we're fighting right now, on many fronts."8 A continuation
of the Sleeper Cell series was scheduled for December 2006.
What accounts for the prominence of the terrorist threat in
the American imagination and the stupendous success of the
War on Terror as a political program? Frame of reference for
policy? Certainly it is not the scale of the threat to the
homeland. Since 9/11 there has been no evidence of any serious
terrorist threat from Islamic extremists inside America, no
sleeper cells, no attacks, no serious planning or preparation for
an attack. Major university studies have reported that 82
percent of all cases presented for prosecution to district
attorneys by the FBI or other law enforcement agencies have
been rejected as lacking sufficient evidence to proceed with
prosecution.9 In the two years after the 2001 attacks the
7. See Spencer Ackerman, How Real is "24"?, SALON, May 16, 2005,
http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2005/05/16/24/index.html (analyzing the distance
between 24's fictionalized world and the actual world of counter-terrorism in
America).
8. John Crook, 'Sleeper Cell' Crosses the Line, ZAP2IT, Dec. 03, 2005,
http://www.tv.com/tracking/viewer.html&refid=28827&tid=80733&ref type=1O1.
9. See, e.g., Transactional Records Access Clearing House, Syracuse
University, Criminal Terrorism Enforcement in the United States During the Five
[Vol. 16:2
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median sentences handed out to those found guilty under the
terrorism laws was 28 days. 10 In the subsequent two years the
median sentence for those (few) found guilty has been 20 days.1
These figures reflect the fact that the great majority of these
prosecutions are not really for terrorism offenses, but for telling
untruths to law enforcement officers, visa violations, and the
like.12
The absence of terrorist activities in the United States is all
the more striking in light of three other considerations. First,
"red-team" exercises, designed to test the effectiveness of anti-
terrorism precautions against determined adversaries, regularly
show how easy it would be for a motivated and minimally
resourced terrorist to circumvent most measures that have been
(or could be) put in place. Second, monthly if not weekly
shootings in schools, malls, and office buildings, show how easy
it would be for terrorists bent simply on killing Americans to do
so. Third, the absence of very many successful prosecutions is
even more compelling evidence than it otherwise would be of the
virtual absence of a serious domestic terrorist threat considering
first, the unprecedentedly exhaustive, constant, unrestrained,
and heavily funded scrutiny of anyone American law
enforcement agencies have had even the vaguest reason to
suspect and second, the government's adoption of a general
posture of "pre-emptive prosecution." 3 For all these reasons,
many Americans, including high-ranking officials and analysts,
have found the absence of attacks to be truly puzzling.
At the end of this essay I will return to the question of al-
Qaeda's motives as a partial answer to this puzzle. However,
what has puzzled me more than the failure of al-Qaeda and its
clones to attack again since 2001 is the related question of how,
in the absence of evidence of a threat, to explain the War on
Terror. What accounts for nearly universal allegiance of
American interest groups to the War on Terror, the steady
Years Since the 9/11/2001 Attacks, httpJ/trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/
(last visited Feb. 01, 2007).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE, Oct. 2006,
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200610/waldman-islam (discussing U.S. Govern-
ment's adoption of a pre-emptive prosecution approach to terrorism). See generally
JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN (2006) (discussing the lack of evidence of a serious
terrorist threat inside the United States).
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polling numbers showing support for it, the often panicky
concern that it is not being prosecuted successfully enough, its
dominance of the political landscape, and the $650 billion that
we have so far spent on it? Answering these questions means
understanding how the War on Terror was triggered, how it
sustains itself, and how it conceals its irrationality.
II. THE WAR IN IRAQ AND THE WAR ON TERROR
The official mantra is that we fight in Iraq because it is the
"central front in the War on Terror." The exact opposite is the
case. We are trapped in fighting an unwinnable and even
nonsensical "War on Terror," because its invention was required
in order to fight in Iraq. When we were struck on September 11,
2001, the U.S. military budget was the equal of the military
budgets of the next 24 most powerful countries. This military
unipolarity sharply reduced the perception of the costs of
military adventures, making it likely that the United States
would fight some kind of war abroad. As such, the supremacist
cabal led by Cheney and Rumsfeld and inspired by the Project
for the New American Century ("PNAC") sought a war in Iraq
as the first stage of a radical transformation of U.S. foreign
policy toward global American hegemony and military
unilateralism. In the first eight months of the George W. Bush
Administration, pragmatists in the State Department, the
uniformed military, and the intelligence community checked the
efforts of the cabal. However, when 9/11 produced an immense
amount of political capital for a President peculiarly ready to
accept the role offered him by the cabal, of anointed
Churchillian savior in a global, epochal, "War on Terror," the
cabal had exactly what it needed. For as they spun it, the global
war on terror divided the world into those "with us vs. those
against us." Coupled with the principle of pre-emption, this
radical division of the world into our camp, and the enemy
camp, rendered automatically any country or group not "with
us" as subject to attack at will by the United States. Thus,
although Iraq had absolutely nothing to do with 9/11, the cabal
was able to devise and implement a formula linking the
September 2001 attacks to its long-cherished goal-forcible
regime change in Iraq as a model for a series of quick, neo-
imperialist wars to revolutionize American foreign policy and
thereby to serve Conservative political objectives at home.
[Vol. 16:2
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Thus, the latent propensity of the United States to go to war,
born of immense military preponderance, enabled the cabal to
portray its long sought invasion of Iraq as a requirement of a
global War on Terror.
The organizational centerpiece for the activities of this
group before 2001 was the PNAC. Its chairman, William
Kristol, is also editor-in-chief of the Weekly Standard, the
magazine universally regarded as the neoconservative
movement's mouthpiece. 14 William Kristol and Robert Kagan
published an informal manifesto of the PNAC in the Council on
Foreign Relations' journal Foreign Affairs in the summer of
1996.15 "Conservatives," they warned, "will not be able to
govern America over the long term if they fail to offer a more
elevated vision of America's international role. '16 The role they
described for the United States was to establish a position of
"benevolent global hegemony" and to preserve it "as far into the
future as possible."17 The dual purpose of the muscular use of
American hyper-power would be to destroy the "world's
monsters" and engage in "empire management."18  To
implement this post-Cold War vision and overcome the electoral
advantages of Clinton-style platforms of multilateralism abroad
and social democracy at home, Kristol and Kagan called for "[a]
true 'conservatism of the heart" that would "emphasize both
personal and national responsibility, relish the opportunity for
national engagement, embrace the possibility of national
greatness, and restore a sense of the heroic ... ."9 They
claimed their "neo-Reaganite foreign policy . . . would be good
for conservatives, good for America, and good for the world ....
Deprived of the support of an elevated patriotism, bereft of the
ability to appeal to national honor, conservatives will ultimately
fail in their effort to govern America." 20
PNAC was the driving force behind Congressional passage
14. The Weekly Standard, About the Weekly Standard, http:ll
www.weeklystandard.com/AboutUs/default.asp (last visited Feb. 01, 2007). Other
prominent neoconservatives associated with the Weekly Standard include executive
editor Fred Barnes and contributing editors Charles Krauthammer, Reuel Marc
Gerecht, and David Frum. Id.
15. William Kristol & Robert Kagan, Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,
75 FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1996, at 18.
16. Id. at 20.
17. Id.at 20, 23.
18. Id. at 26-31.
19. Id. at 32.
20. Id.
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of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act. In January of that year PNAC
had delivered a letter to President Clinton demanding war to
remove Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and to remove and replace Saddam and his regime as a crucial
first step to transforming the Middle East.21 "We urge," said the
letter:
[A] new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our
friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the
removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power .... [Including] a willingness
to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing .... [Tihat now
needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.
22
In addition to the names of many of those who signed the
PNAC statement of purpose, and who became high-ranking
officials in the George W. Bush Administration (such as Donald
Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Elliot Abrams), names on this
letter also included Richard Perle (named chairman of the
defense policy board), Richard L. Armitage (deputy secretary of
state), John Bolton (undersecretary of state for arms control,
later ambassador to the United Nations), and R. James Woolsey
(former CIA director and member of the defense policy board). 23
Within a year after the 9/11 attacks, the neoconservative
cabal got what it had sought for so long-a Presidential decision
to invade Iraq.2 4 Now, however, after years of slaughter in that
country, the neoconservative/supremacist fantasy of a series of
cheap, fast hegemony-building wars is dead. The War on
Terror, however, born of the neoconservative cabal's need for a
21. Letter from Elliot Abrams et al., Project for the New American Century, to
William J. Clinton, President of the United States (Jan. 26, 1998), http:/!
www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm.
22. Id.
23. Id. George Packer, THE ASSASSIN'S GATE (2005), discusses the background
of some key neoconservative activists. Mark Gerson and Joshua Muravchik give the
meaning of "neoconservative" a sympathetic treatment. See MARK GERSON, THE
NEOCONSERVATIVE VISION: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE CULTURE WARS (1996);
Joshua Muravchik, Neoconservative Cabal, COMMENTARY, Sept. 2003, at 26. Anne
Norton gives a very different view of "neoconservative." See ANNE NORTON, LEO
STRAUSS AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2004). For Armitage's "defection"
to the Powell camp that tried to block the PNAC agenda, he was widely regarded
within the cabal as a political traitor.
24. See IAN S. LUSTICK, TRAPPED IN THE WAR ON TERROR 48-70 (2006)
(discussing the decisiveness of inside-the-beltway brawl between the pragmatic and
supremacist wings of the first George W. Bush administration).
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justification for the invasion of Iraq that could link it to 9/11,
lives on, stronger than ever. The question we are left with,
then, is not how did the War on Terror begin, but how did it
take on a life of its own and trap the entire political class, and
most Americans, into public beliefs about the need to fight a
global war on terror as our first priority, even when there's no
evidence of an enemy present in the United States?
III. HURRICANE OSAMA
We may begin to understand the answer to this question by
considering how Congress and state and local governments
responded to the War on Terror. In the summer of 2003 a list of
160 potential targets for terrorists was drawn up, triggering
intense efforts by Representatives and Senators, and their
constituents, to find funding-generating targets in their
districts. These pressures resulted in ever broader categories
for listing what could be construed as potential targets of
terrorism. The names of these lists changed rapidly between
2003 and 2005, from "Critical Assets," to "Protected Measures
Target List," to "Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource List," to
"National Asset Data Base." These widening categories enabled
mushrooming increases in the number of "assets" (commonly
identified by county governments throughout the country)
deemed worthy of protection: up to 1849 in late 2003; 28,364 in
2004; 77,069 in 2005; and an estimated 300,000 in 2006
(including the Sears Tower in Chicago, but also the Indiana
Apple and Pork Festival).25
Across the country virtually every lobby and interest group
cast their traditional objectives and funding proposals as more
important than ever given the imperatives of the War on Terror.
According to the National Rifle Association, the War on Terror
means more Americans should carry firearms to defend the
country and themselves against terrorists. In April 2002, NRA
executive director Wayne LaPierre was reported to be
celebrating "'increased momentum since Sept. 11' for laws
25. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND SPECIAL REVIEWS, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING THE NATIONAL ASSET DATABASE,
(2006) (detailing the complex and confusing history of these lists); JOHN MOTEFF,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2006) (detailing the complex and confusing
history of these lists).
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permitting concealed guns."26 After the attacks in September
2001, said LaPierre, "people are unsettled and have a fear of the
unknown and of a threat that could come from anywhere, they'd
rather face that threat with a firearm than without one."27 In
2003 the gun lobby announced a new program called NRASafe,
described by LaPierre as involving all NRA members in a kind
of national neighborhood watch program within the War on
Terror. 28
As freedom's keepers, we cannot be a passive observer in this epic
confrontation with evil. I believe this great association has a unique
role to play in homeland security. God helps he who helps himself, and
nobody knows that better than NRA members. We understand that
liberty requires eternal vigilance. Not just as a government, but as a
people.29
In point of fact, however, the gun lobby had been beaten to
the punch by the gun control lobby. Within one week after the
9/11 attacks, gun control lobbying organizations began
campaigns linking their long-standing policy preferences for
increased restrictions on access to firearms to the need to
protect the country against terrorism.30 An extensive study
sponsored by the Brady Center to Stop Gun Violence quoted
Bush's November 2001 speech to the United Nations: "We have
a responsibility," said the President, "to deny weapons to
terrorists and to actively prevent private citizens from providing
them."31 That was all the anti-gun lobby needed to use the War
on Terror for its own purposes. "Terrorists and guns go
together," reads the Brady Center study.32
The gun is part of the essential tool kit of domestic and foreign
terrorists alike. Guns are used to commit terrorist acts, and guns are
used by terrorists to resist law enforcement efforts at apprehension
26. Steve Friess, NRA Counts on 9/11 Momentum at Convention, USA TODAY,
Apr. 26, 2002 at 4A.
27. Id.
28. See Christy Allen, The Second Amendment IS Homeland Security:
American Gun Rights Activism post September 11, 2001 at 9-10,
http://www.essex.ac.uk/sociology/postgraduates/6_allen.pdf (discussing how the
larger movement of gun rights activists have changed their narrative to capitalize
on the War on Terror) (last visited Feb. 02, 2007)
29. Id. at 9 (quoting author's filed notes) (emphasis original).
30. See LOREN BERGER & DENNIS HENIGAN, BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE, GUNs AND TERROR: How TERRORISTS EXPLOIT OUR WEAK GUN LAWS
(2001), http://www.bradycenter.org/xshare/pdf/reports/gunsandterror.pdf.
31. Id. at3.
32. Id.
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and arrest. The oft-seen file footage of Osama Bin Laden, aiming his
AK-47 at an unknown target, is now a familiar reminder of the
incontrovertible connection between terrorism and guns. For terrorists
around the world, the United States is the Great Gun Bazaar. 33
The list of interest groups able to recast their long-sought
objectives as imperatives of the War on Terror is virtually
endless. Schools of Veterinary Medicine called for quadrupling
their funding. Who else would train veterinarians to defend the
country against terrorists using hoof and mouth disease to
decimate our cattle herds? 34 Pediatricians declared that more
funding was required to train pediatricians as first responders
to terrorist attacks since treating children as victims is not the
same as treating adults. 35 Pharmacists advocated the creation
of pharmaceutical SWAT teams to respond quickly with
appropriate drugs. 36 Aside from swarms of beltway bandit
consulting firms and huge corporate investments in counter-
terrorism activities, universities across the country created
graduate programs in Homeland Security and dozens of
institutes on terrorism and counter-terrorism, all raising huge
catcher's mitts into the air for the billions of dollars of grants
and contracts just blowing in the wind.37
As these and other groups found counter-terrorism slogans
effective in raising revenue, they became even more committed
to the War on Terror, convincing those who had been slow to
define themselves as part of the War, to do so quickly or lose
out. The same imperative-translate your agenda into War on
Terror requirements or be starved of funds-and its spiraling
33. Id.
34. Paul Gibbs, The Foot-and-Mouth Disease epidemic of 2001 in the UK:
Implications for the USA and the "War on Terror", 30 J. VETERINARY MED. EDUC.
121, 130-31 (2003).
35. Steven Krug, Chairman of Comm. on Pediatric Emergency Med., Am. Acad.
of Pediatrics, Testimony before the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science and Technology, Emergency Care Crisis: A Nation
Unprepared for Public Health Disasters (July 26, 2006), http://www.aap.org/
advocacy/washing/ER-readiness testimonyFINAL.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
36. See Letter from the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy ET AL, to Max
Baucus, U.S. Senator (Jan. 25, 2002), http://www.amcp.org/data/legislative/
analysis/21202.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2007) (letter to Congress signed by eleven
professional and trade associations linked to the pharmaceutical industry and
listing this and other recommended measures).
37. See, e.g., Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis and Response (ISTAR),
List of Scholars, http://www.istar.upenn.edu/scholars/index.html (one such initiative
based at the University of Pennsylvania, where I teach, where I myself am listed as
a resource person) (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
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consequences surged across the government, affecting virtually
all agencies. Bureaucrats unable to think of a way to describe
their activities in War on Terror terms were virtually
disqualified from budget increases and probably doomed to
cuts. 38 With billions of dollars a year in state and local funding,
the Department of Homeland Security devised a list of fifteen
National Planning Scenarios to help guide its allocations. 39 To
qualify for Homeland Security funding state and local
governments had to describe how they would use allocated
funds to meet one of those chosen scenarios. What was the
process that produced this list? It was deeply political, driven
by competition among agencies, states, and localities who knew
that funding opportunities would depend on exactly which
scenarios were included or excluded-with anthrax, a chemical
attack on a sports stadium, and hoof and mouth disease
included, but attacks on liquid natural gas tankers and West
Nile virus excluded. Most instructive of all, in this process, was
the unwillingness of the government to define the enemy posing
the terrorist threat. Why? Because once defined, certain
scenarios, profitable for some competitors, would be disqualified.
Thus the enemy, in these scenarios, is referred to as "the
universal adversary," in other words, as Satan. That is how the
War on Terror drives the country from responding to threats to
preparing for vulnerabilities, producing an irrational and
doomed strategic posture which treats any bad thing that could
happen as a national security imperative. 40
Of course this entire dynamic is accelerated by the principle
of Cover Your Ass (CYA). Each policy-maker knows that if
38. See LUSTICK, supra note 23, pp. 71-114 (giving details and a plethora of
examples of the dynamics of the "War on Terror whirlwind").
39. David Howe, Senior Dir. for Response and Planning, Homeland Security
Council, Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, July 2004, http://cryptome.org(
15-attacks.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
40. Id. The executive summary of the National Planning Scenarios study
explains the term "Universal Adversary" as follows: "Because the attacks could be
caused by foreign terrorists; domestic radical groups; state-sponsored adversaries; or
in some cases, disgruntled employees, the perpetrator has been named, the
Universal Adversary (UA)." The authors of the study justify this abstraction by
stressing that the "focus of the scenarios is on response capabilities and needs, not
threat-based prevention activities." What is instructive is the attempt to separate
"responses" from threats. What could be more reinforcing for an ever-expanding
War on Terror than imperatives to prepare for dangers of any kind, whether threats
are perceived to exist or not, simply because when dealing with the "Universal
Adversary," anything is possible?
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there is another attack, no one will be able to predict where and
when it will be, but after it occurs it will be easy to discover who
it was who did not approve some project or level of funding that
could have prevented it. Every government official is perfectly
aware of this asymmetry and perfectly aware also that the most
attractive strategy in such a predicament is to endorse whatever
option commits more resources to counter-terrorist efforts. In
that way, if there is no attack, it can partially be explained by
the wise (if expensive) precautionary measures taken. If there
is an attack, at least the official who argued for exerting more
effort or spending more money will not be blamed for the failure
to prevent it.
Another powerful driver of the War on Terror whirlwind is
competition among politicians. While Karl Rove and company
systematically, explicitly, and successfully used accusations of
Democrats suffering from a "pre-9/11 mentality" as his weapon
of choice against them in the 2002 and 2004 elections,
Democrats were irresistibly drawn to the same slogans. When
it was reported that some American ports were to be run, in
part, by a company associated with the Arab sheikhdom of
Dubai, Democrats fell all over themselves excoriating President
Bush for his obvious incompetence and even, perhaps, his lack
of sanity, for making America even more vulnerable to terrorist
attack. The absence of any evidence or expert evaluation
suggesting that this measure was dangerous had little or no
impact on this (successful) Democratic barrage. Similarly, it
was the iconic status of the 9/11 Commission and not the actual
importance or appropriateness of its analysis and advice, that
led Nancy Pelosi to declare that in the first 100 days of a
Democratic controlled congress every single one of the 9/11
Commission's recommendations would be fully implemented.
Of course the real beneficiary of such overheated, hyper-
politicized argumentation over who is more counter-terrorist
than thou is the War on Terror itself. Its status as a national
priority to which all politicians must pay homage is powerfully
reinforced by such competition while its own irrationalities are
shielded by an ever thicker protective belt of public catechisms
required of any politician to avoid the tag of being "soft" or "pre-
9/11" in the War on Terror.
Beyond the activities of lobbyists, interest groups,
bureaucrats, corporations, and politicians, there is, however, no
more important energy source for the War on Terror than the
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media. I have already noted the contribution made by a flood of
novels, films and television shows exploiting the thrills of
imagined terrorism. But we must also appreciate the direct
contribution to the War on Terror made by the news media.
Consider what happens when a hurricane or a blizzard bears
down on a large American city: the local news media has a field
day. Ratings rise. Announcers are barely able to contain their
excitement. Meteorologists become celebrities. They warn of
the storm of the century. Viewers are glued to their sets. Soon,
however, the storm hits and passes, or fizzles and is forgotten.
Either way the "storm of the century" story ends. Ratings for
local news shows return to normal and anchors shift their
attention back to murders, fires, and auto accidents.
When it comes to the War on Terror, however, the "storm of
the century," Hurricane Osama, as it were, is always about to
hit, and never goes away. For the national media this is as good
as it gets. The terrorist threat level is always and everywhere
no less than "elevated." Absent any actual attacks or detectable
threats, government agencies manufacture pseudo-victories over
alleged or sting-produced plots to justify hundreds of billions of
dollars worth of mostly silly expenditures. With every lost soul
captured by the FBI presented as the latest incarnation of
Mohammad Atta, the news media and the entertainment
industry fairly exults, thriving on fears stoked by evocations of
9/11 and the ready availability of disaster scenarios too varied to
be thwarted but too frightening to be ignored. Compounded by
media sensationalism, these fears then provide irresistible
opportunities for ambitious politicians to attack one another for
failing to protect the terrorist target du jour: ports, border
crossings, the milk supply, cattle herds, liquid natural gas
tankers, nuclear power plants, drinking water, tunnels, bridges,
or subways. The result of such sensationalist coverage,
accompanied by advice from academic or corporate experts
anxious to sell their counter-terrorism schemes to a terrified
public and a cover-your-ass obsessed government bureaucracy,
is another wave of support for increased funding for the War on
Terror. But every precaution quickly produces speculation
about work-arounds the terrorists could use, thereby fueling
another cycle of anxiety, blame, expert counter-terrorist advice,
and increased funding.
These are the vicious circles, the self-powering dynamics,
that produce and reproduce widespread hysteria in America
[Vol. 16:2
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over non-existent "sleeper cells" and over our real, but
unavoidable, vulnerability to bad things happening. Such
hysteria has not been seen here since the anti-communist frenzy
of the McCarthy era. It is nothing short of humiliating that the
country that was able to adjust psychologically, politically, and
militarily to the real capacity of the Soviet enemy to incinerate
our cities on a moment's notice has been reduced to moaning,
wasting resources, and spinning in circles, by ragged bands of
Muslim fanatics.
IV. ESCAPING THE TRAP OF THE WAR ON TERROR
We have been, and are being, suckered, suckered big-time.
Before the attacks, al-Qaeda was a shattered remnant of a failed
movement, dropping into the dustbin of history, the equivalent
of the Aryan Nations on the American political scene. But the
diabolical strikes against the twin towers and the Pentagon
saved the jihadis. Well, not really. What .saved them from
political oblivion and lifted them to protagonists declared as
equivalent in potency and world-historic importance to Nazi
Germany and Imperial Japan, was the American reaction to
those attacks. Our invasion of Iraq, cast within a global War on
Terror, was for them the "crusade" that makes their world of
"jihad" appear not just real but compellingly real to hundreds of
millions of Muslims. The Bush Administration launched the
War on Terror, but it was a war fought according to Osama's
script. Now our army is broken and demoralized in an Iraq War
that breeds al-Qaeda recruits and turns their propaganda into
reality. Meanwhile the very strength of American democracy
and free enterprise-motivating every faction in America to
turn the War on Terror to its own interest-is hijacked and
turned against us by our adversaries just as effectively as they
hit us with our own airplanes on 9/11.
We wanted to arm wrestle with our enemies. Why not? We
have more economic and military muscle than any state in
history. But that is precisely why they fight us with judo, using
our strengths against us. They hijack our planes to attack our
buildings. They use our passionate patriotism to propel us in
reaction into a war in the Middle East that exactly serves their
interests, and was the main reason for their attack. And they
hijack Madisonian democracy itself, to create a vortex of
aggrandizing exploitation of the War on Terror for self-
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interested agendas that spin our country out of control.
One of the things that the War on Terror does to defend
itself is prevent itself from being known for the Emperor's
Clothes phenomenon it fundamentally is. Aside from deterring
those politicians and bureaucrats who understand the
spectacular irrationality of the War on Terror from saying as
much, the truth about its dynamics are concealed by
suppressing knowledge of the real attributes, plans, capabilities,
and aspirations of al-Qaeda. For if we knew and understood al-
Qaeda and Osama bin-Laden properly, we would understand
that a "War on Terror" is exactly not how we can combat that
threat. For example, almost no one in America is aware of a
passage at the end of his famous tape on November 1, 2004,
released right before the election. Bin Laden said:
[I]t [is] easy for us to provoke and bait this administration. All that we
have to do is to send two mujahidin Uihadists] to the furthest point
east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaida, in order to
make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human,
economic, and political losses without their achieving for it anything of
note other than some benefits for their private companies ....
So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of
bankruptcy.
That being said . . .when one scrutinises the results, one cannot say
that al-Qaida is the sole factor in achieving those spectacular gains.
Rather, the policy of the White House that demands the opening of war
fronts to keep busy their various corporations-whether they be
working in the field of arms or oil or reconstruction-has helped al-
Qaida to achieve these enormous results.
And so it has appeared to some analysts and diplomats that the White
House and us are playing as one team towards the economic goals of
the United States, even if the intentions differ.
.... [Flor example, al-Qaida spent $500,000 on the event [the 9/11
attacks], while America, in the incident and its aftermath, lost -
according to the lowest estimate - more than $500 billion.
Meaning that every dollar of al-Qaida defeated a million dollars by the
permission of Allah, besides the loss of a huge number of jobs. 41
41. Bin Laden, Speech Broadcast on Al-Jazeerah (Nov. 1, 2004),
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Know your enemy is the first rule of combat. The War on
Terror conceals itself as our enemy by also concealing the true
nature of al-Qaeda and its clones. For if we were able to base
our policies on the actual capabilities, intentions, weaknesses,
and potential strengths of Muslim extremists of the al-Qaeda
variety, we would assuredly be able to develop a mode of
vigilance and a plan of attack that would be both sustainable
and effective. With no theory of our enemy whatsoever, apart
from imagining we are faced with an all azimuth, constant, and
utterly ruthless threat of attack from the "Universal
Adversary," we find ourselves as if immersed in a pot of water
atop a stove. Fearful that neighboring molecules might
suddenly burst into steam we expend fruitless efforts scanning
every molecule in sight, seeking ways to predict which one will
burst into steam next in order to stop it before it does.
Obviously, a more sensible strategy puts our emphasis on
turning down the heat under the pot. This strategy calls for
political action and diplomacy to engage the Muslim world as a
whole on issues of mutual and practical concern, thereby
isolating the jihadis from the mass of Muslims whose
sympathies our War on Terror has so far helped transform in
favor of the jihadis.42
This will mean breaking the grip the War on Terror has on
our political system and on the debate in America over how to
respond to "terrorists with global reach." It means returning, as
we did after overcoming the McCarthyist hysteria of the early
1950s, to a policy based on realistic assessments of our enemies'
intentions, capabilities, and weaknesses, and on confident
assessments of our own resilience as a nation. Until we do so,
we will cripple our ability to focus properly on security problems
that do exist, and instead remain trapped in the War on Terror.
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4AlC-B21F-
2BC36E87F61F.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
42. LuSTICK, supra note 23, pp. 140-45 (discussing American options in this
regard).
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